We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to investigate how wealth, political history, occupation, and other demographic variables (taken from a comprehensive earlier household survey) are correlated with risk and time discounting measured in experiments. Experimental results show that in villages with higher mean income, people are less lossaverse and more patient. Villagers in the north who had worked on collective farms and received food from the government on a regular basis are less averse to loss. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those simple approximations with prospect theory and a three-parameter hyperbolic discounting model.
A fundamental question in development economics is the extent to which economic success is linked to basic features of human preferences. If people are extremely averse to financial risk, they may be reluctant to create businesses that may have inherently risky cash flows. If people are impatient, they may be reluctant to invest and educate their children (as education is a long-term investment in future income).
Taken together, risk-aversion and impatience may explain, in part, why some people remain poor.
We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to directly measure risk and time preferences of individuals, and investigated how these preferences correlate with economic circumstances. Vietnam has several advantages as a field site:
1. Access to a 2002 living standard survey conducted in Vietnam enabled us to link survey responses from individuals directly to experimental responses by the same individuals. Having the previous survey responses also enabled us to handpick a sample of villages with a wide range of average incomes to study the effect of cross-village income differences.
2. Many Vietnamese villagers are poor but literate. As a result, it is both easy to motivate them with modest financial stakes, and to ensure they comprehend experimental instructions. 1 3. The recent rise of household businesses in the market economy has created substantial variation in occupation and household income. This occupation and income variation can be correlated with preference measures.
In any cross-sectional study like this, it is difficult to infer the direction of causality from correlation: Do preferences cause economic circumstances (e.g., through business formation, for example), or do circumstances create preferences (as described by Samuel Bowles (1998))? An ideal study would use randomized assignment of individuals to economic circumstances. As an alternative, we employ an instrumental variable 1 According to the World Bank (2005) , 45 percent of the rural population lives below the poverty line (p. 279). So modest experimental payments, by Western standards, amount to several days' wages. At the same time, the national literacy rate is around 90 percent (and is slightly higher in our sample), There are only three countries which are both poorer (lower GNP per capita) and more literate--Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and approach, using expenses for funerals and crop failure due to pests, which are unlikely to be correlated with preferences, as instrumental variables for income.
One fact about Vietnam can be also used to infer something about causality. In Vietnam, government policies strongly penalize inter-regional migration. Migrants are not recognized as permanent residents and cannot receive health care and public education. As a result, migration is rare (only six out of the 181 subjects in our study moved into their current villages in the last ten years). To the extent that people are stuck in their villages, any observed correlation between preferences and village economic variables is consistent with the interpretation that circumstances are causing preferences, rather than the other way around.
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Besides contributing new data, our paper makes a methodological contribution to experimental development economics. Most previous experiments conducted in the field tested simple models of risk and time preferences that can be characterized by one parameter. (The thorough review by Juan-Camilo Cardenas and Jeffrey Carpenter (2006) summarizes many of these studies). These simple models have often been rejected by experimental data in Western educated populations (Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue, 2002, Chris Starmer, 2000) and by field data (Colin F. Camerer, 2000) in favor of models with multiple components of risk and time preferences. For example, in expected utility theory (EU), risk preferences are characterized solely by the concavity of a utility function for money. But if risky choices are expressions of prospect theory preferences (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 1979) , then utility concavity is not the only parameter influencing risk preferencesnonlinear weighting of probabilities, and aversion to loss compared to gain also influence risk preferences. Our instruments are designed to measure all three parameters in prospect theory, rather than just one in EU.
Similarly, we measure three parameters in a general time discounting model (Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin and Andrew Schotter, 2005) , rather than just measuring a single exponential discount rate as in most other studies. If the simpler instruments are adequate approximations, then our richer instruments will deliver parameter values of the extra variables which affirm the virtue of the simple instruments. Our results, in fact, indicate the extra parameters typically take on values which reject the simpler theories, and are correlated with individual differences in sensible ways.
Before proceeding to design details and results, it is useful to discuss how our approach compares to other field experiments. Field experiments in development are powerful tools for policy evaluation because they can randomize treatments in naturallyoccurring decision making to see how well a specific policy works in a specific setting with a proper control group (see Esther Duflo (2005) for a review). For example, Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan and Wesley Yin (2006) found that women who displayed lower discount rates in a hypothetical-question survey were more likely to open a commitment savings account offered by a rural bank in the Philippines.
Our approach is different. Our study is designed to collect preference measures experimentally and correlate those measures with many different demographic and economic variables (income, in particular) from the previous household survey. The goal is to contribute basic tools for field experimentation and to generate tentative observations about the correlation between preferences and economic circumstances. No single result will be as conclusive as more targeted studies which explore the effect of a specific policy. Nevertheless, the policy-specific approach and our broad approach are complementary. Targeted studies like Ashraf et al.'s tell broader studies like ours what to look for. Broader studies like ours give a rich set of tentative results for more targeted studies like Ashraf et al.'s to explore more carefully. Accumulation of regularity will come fastest from doing both types of studies.
We find that people in poorer villages are not necessarily more risk-averse, but they are more loss-averse. People living in poorer villages are also less patient. This suggests economic development could influence preferences; the wealthier the villages become, the less loss averse and more patient are the villagers. Furthermore, villagers in the north who had worked on collective farms and received food from the government on a regular basis are less averse to loss. This implies appropriate welfare policies can potentially reduce aversion to loss. Some descriptive statistics about the nine experimental village sites are given in Table 1 . The southern villages are indexed by S1 -S5 (where S1 indexes the highest village wealth and S5 indexes the lowest), and northern villages are indexed by N1 -N4.
I. Selection of research sites and research methods
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The mean annual income in village S1 is 36. 
B. Measurement of prospect theory parameters
We consider prospect theory as an alternative theoretical framework to EU, and conduct experiments with lotteries involving gains and losses (to measure loss-aversion).
In EU, risk preferences are characterized solely by the concavity of a utility function. Prospect theory suggests utility concavity is not the only parameter influencing risk preferences-nonlinear weighting of probabilities, and aversion to loss compared to gain also influence risk preferences.
We use cumulative prospect theory 8 and the one-parameter form of Drazen Prelec (1998)'s axiomatically-derived weighting function as follows:
The expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of the outcome x with the probability p and the outcome y with the probability q is denoted by ( x, p; y,q) .
The function To elicit the three prospect theory parameters, we designed three series of paired lotteries as shown in Table 2 . Look at Series 1 first. Each row is a choice between two binary lotteries, A or B. We put 10 numbered balls in a bongo cage, and draw one ball from the cage after all subjects made decisions. Suppose a subject chooses A for the first 8 We follow the functional forms (1) and (2) in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . 9 Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund (2002), and Leslie Real (1991) show that contrary to the standard assumption of prospect theory, children and bees have S-shaped weighting functions, underweighting small-probability outcomes and overweighting large-probability outcomes. (Real's study does not control for concavity of the utility of nectar, however, and may therefore misidentify curvature of the weighting function.) Steven J. Humphrey and Arjan Verschoor (2004) find that in Ethiopia, Indian and Uganda, some individuals make choices which are consistent with S-shaped weighting functions. However, they use only three probabilities (25, 50 and 75 percent) which may not be ideal choices to estimate nonlinear weighting of extreme probabilities.
row of Series 1, and the first row of Series 1 was selected for the actual payment. If the number 4 ball is drawn from the bingo cage, the subject will receive 10,000 dong.
We enforced monotonic switching by asking subjects at which question they would "switch" from Option A to Option B in each Series. They can switch to Option B starting with the first question (i.e., they can choose Option B in every row), and they do not have to switch to Option B at all. 10 After they completed three series of questions with the total of 35 choices, we draw a numbered ball from a bingo cage with 35 numbered balls, to determine which row of choice will be played for real money. We then put back 10 numbered balls in the bingo cage and played the selected lottery.
The difference in expected value between the lotteries (A relative to B) is shown in the right column. Notice as one moves down the rows, the higher payoff in Option B increases and everything else is fixed. Most individuals choose Option A in the first row and, as the high potential payoff in Option B increases going down the rows, switch to preferring B over A at some point. The largest payoff, 1.7 million dong (about 107 dollars), is equivalent to 24 percent of the annual mean income in Village N4. Series 2 is similar, but with different payoffs and probabilities. Series 3 involves both gains and losses.
The choices are carefully designed so any combination of choices in the three series determines a particular combination of prospect theory parameter values. Table 3 illustrates the combinations of approximate values of σ (parameter for the curvature of power value function), α (probability sensitivity parameter in Prelec's weighting function), and λ (loss aversion parameter) for each switching point. "Never" indicates the cases in which a subject does not switch to Option B (i.e., always choose A). The switching points in Series 1 and 2 jointly determine σ and α. For example, suppose a subject switched from Option A to B at the seventh question in Series 1. The combinations of (σ,α) which can rationalize this switch are (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9) or (1, 1). Now suppose the same subjects also switched from Option A to B at the seventh question in Series 2. Then the combinations 10 The instructions gave three examples. In one example a subject switches at the sixth question, in one example the subject chooses option A for all questions, and in one example the subject chooses Option B for all questions. The three examples were given to help ensure that subjects do not feel that they are forced to switch.
of (σ,α) which rationalize that switch are (0.8, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.6, 0.8), (0.5, 0.9), or (0.4, 1). By intersecting these parameter ranges from Series 1 and 2, we obtain the approximate values of (σ,α)=(0.7, 0.7). 11 Predictions of (σ,α) for all possible combinations of choices are given in Table A .1 in the Appendix. If a subject is an EU maximizer under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (which is commonly assumed in the literature), the combinations of switching points in Series 1 and 2 are (7,1), (8,2), (9,3), (10,4), (11, 5) , (12,6), (13,7), (14,8), or (Never, 9).
The loss aversion parameter λ is determined by the switching point in Series 3.
Notice that λ cannot be uniquely inferred from switching in Series 3; the range of λ values that are implied by each switching point depends on the utility curvature σ.
However, questions in Series 3 were constructed to make sure that λ takes similar values across different levels of σ. Table 3 shows the range of λ for each switching point for three values of σ; σ=0.2, 0.6 and 1. The later they switch from A to B (i.e., for highernumbered questions), the more averse they are to losses.
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Before proceeding to results, let us highlight our hypotheses. If prospect theory is a more appropriate model than EU, we expect α (probability sensitivity parameter) to be smaller than 1, and λ (loss aversion parameter) to be larger than 1. If EU is a suitable 11 When a subject switches from Option A to B at the seventh questions in both Series 1 and 2, the following inequalities should hold.
" ) , and
The ranges of σ and α that satisfy the above inequalities are 0.65<σ<0.74 and 0.66<α<0.74. The point (σ,α)=(0.7, 0.7) satisfies the condition. When subjects do not switch, the approximate values at the boundaries were used. For example, if a subject never switches either in Series 1 or Series 2, the largest approximate values of σ and α that satisfy the following inequalities are used:
). 12 Development economists sometimes consider "safety-first" decision rules which evaluate options by whether they have a less than p chance of some catastrophic loss L, and then apply another decision criterion to the choices which first pass that safety criterion. If L is between 4,000 and 21,000 such a rule will produce switching in the series 3 choices that will look like loss-aversion. It is difficult to separate safety-first and loss-aversion without having more structure on the form of the safety-first rule and a test to sharply distinguish them. model, then α and λ won't be significantly different from 1. In addition, EU predicts that wealth is negatively correlated with risk aversion (decreasing absolute risk aversion). Figure 1 shows the distributions of choices made by subjects in Series 1 and 2.
C. Empirical results
The numbers in the axes correspond to the switching points in Series 1 and 2. 13 The height of a cone represents the number of subjects who switched at that particular combination of switching points in Series 1 and 2. Black cones represent the choices which are consistent with the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) hypothesis of EU.
Notice there are not many subjects whose choices are consistent with CRRA. Figure 2 shows the distributions of estimated σ and α. The mean estimated values of (σ, α) are (0.59, 0.74) and (0.63, 0.74) in the south and north, respectively. 14 The average derived value of α is significantly different from 1 at the 1% significance level by t-test, implying our experimental results reject EU in favor of inverted-S shaped probability weighting.
We regressed the curvature of the utility function (σ) using OLS regressions, and loss-aversion (λ) by interval regressions using maximum likelihood techniques against individual-specific variables. We first ran regressions using absolute income as an independent variable. The regression results are shown in columns (1) and (3) in Table 4 (See Table 5 for variable definitions). Looking first at σ (curvature of the utility function), the strongest effects suggest subjects who are more educated, elder and those living far from markets are more risk-averse (i.e., negative effect on σ), and fishermen 15 are less risk-averse (i.e., positive effect on σ). The estimation result for loss aversion (λ)
shows ethnic Chinese and government officers are less loss averse and people living in the South are more loss averse. influence of political regime. 16 People in the north worked on collective farms for many years, and the government provided them with food for subsistence, so the social safety net may be reflected in less aversion to losses. The income variable is not significantly correlated with either the curvature of the utility function (σ) or loss aversion (λ).
The distribution of estimated λ is shown in Figure 2 . Columns (2) and (4) in Table 4 contain the regression results of the estimations.
Neither relative income nor mean income of the village explains the concavity of utility function. However, mean village income is strongly correlated with loss aversion. This is consistent with the idea that wealthy villages provide "social insurance" which spreads risks of loss among villagers, and decreases loss aversion.
We also conducted instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) regressions because income might cause preference, or preference might cause income. It is useful to have an exogenous cause of income as an instrument to disentangle causality.
We used the costs of funeral and crop failure due to pests as exogenous instruments for income in the regressions. 17 The variable "crop failure due to pests" is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the commune officials reported it to the surveyor in 2002. We use the relative costs of funerals as an instrument for relative income, and failure due to pests as an instrument of mean village income.
16 Terry A. Rambo(1973) reports that the social structures were different in the North and South before communism. It is possible that Northern villages have a stronger social safety net system by tradition. 17 We first tested four instrumental variables, funeral costs, natural disaster relief, the crop failure due to natural disaster and pests, and selected funeral costs and crop failure due to pests as instruments, since these variables had the highest correlation with the income variable.
The IV regression results are shown in Table 6 . The effects on σ and λ noted in 
B. Measurement of time discounting parameters
We use a general model proposed by Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin and Andrew Schotter (2005) which allows us to test exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and a more general form. In our experiments, we give a long series of choices between smaller rewards delivered today, and larger rewards delivered at specified times in the future. This battery of pairwise choices permits estimation of their clever three-factor model. The model values a reward of y at time t according to yD(y,t) where
The three factors r, β and θ separate conventional time discounting (r), presentbias (β) and hyperbolicity (θ) of the discount function. When θ=1 and β=1, the equation reduces to exponential discounting. When θ=2 and β=1, it reduces to true hyperbolic discounting. When θ=1 and β is free, it reduces to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. When θ>2 the function is "hyper-hyperbolic"-the second derivative of the discount factor D(y,t) is even higher than for a hyperbolic (i.e., the weight on future rewards drops even more steeply than in a hyperbolic function). The three-parameter form enables a way to compare three familiar models at once.
We used 15 combinations of y and t in the experiments, i.e. 30,000, 120,000 and 300,000 dong with the delays of one week, one month and three months, and 60,000 and 240,000 dong with the delays of three days, two weeks and two months (see Table A .2 in the Appendix for all combinations). The largest amount of y, 300,000 dong (about 19 dollars), is equivalent to 15 days of wage in the rural north.
For each (y,t) combination, we asked five questions, with x equal to 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, and 5/6 of the value of y. Subjects were presented with a total of 75 choices between two options:
Option A: Receive x dong today.
Option B: Receive y dong in t days. Koszegi, 2003 , David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto and Jeremy Tobacman, 1998 , O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999 , 2001 Subjects gave a switching point from preferring A to B in each series of five questions. Before conducting the experiment, we publicly suggested a trusted agent who would keep the money until delayed delivery date to ensure subjects believed the money would be delivered. The selected trusted persons were usually village heads or presidents of women's associations. In some villages, the trusted agents were also experimental subjects. Agreement letters of money delivery were signed between the trusted agents and the first author. Agents were instructed to deliver the money to the houses of experimental subjects, which equalizes the pure transaction costs of receiving money immediately (i.e., at the end of the experiment) or in the future. In small villages like these there is a high level of trust and no subject expressed any concern about not getting future delivery of their money. Furthermore, if the subjects thought they could choose a large delayed reward, but actually receive the money earlier than the delayed period, they would appear to be patient; the results show that they generally did not. After subjects completed all 75 questions, we put 75 numbered balls in the bingo cage and drew one ball to determine which pairwise choice would be paid. The option chosen for that question (i.e. A or B) determined how much money was to be delivered, and when.
Denote the probability of choosing immediate reward of x over the delayed reward of y in t days by P(x>(y,t)), and use a logistic function to describe this probabilistic relation as follows:
We estimate the parameters µ, β, θ and r in the above logistic function. For example, if a subject chose to receive 120,000 dong in 1 week over 20,000 dong of immediate reward (choosing A) and switch to B when the immediate reward is increase to 40,000, then the dependent variable for the first response is 1 and the dependent variable for the second response is 0. The variable ! µ is a response sensitivity or noise parameter. For each subject, there are thirty observations, two observations for just before and after the switching point for each of fifteen series of questions.
C. Empirical results
Estimation results comparing specific functions are given in Table 7 . We fitted the logistic function (2) by using a nonlinear least-squares regression procedure. 22 In addition to the general model (1) (shown in the far right column), we estimated restrictions of exponential discounting (θ=β=1), hyperbolic discounting (θ=2, β=1), and (β, δ) quasi-hyperbolic discounting (θ=1). Estimating the full model (1) with unrestricted θ gives a surprisingly high value of θ (5.07, similar to Benhabib et al's estimates) and influences the estimates of r and β but does not improve R 2 much, so we focus attention on the (β, δ) model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, with θ=1 imposed.
Next, we estimate the following logistic function (3) to investigate whether demographic variables explain individual difference in present bias (β) and discount rates (δ). Table 8 shows the results from regressing estimates of the (β, δ) model of quasihyperbolic discounting, allowing ß and r to depend on demographic variables. We conducted non-linear estimations of the logistic function (3), using absolute income as an independent variable for the first regression (reported in column (1)), and relative and mean village income as independent variables for the second regression (reported in column (2)). 23 In order to obtain robust variance estimates with repeated observations on individual subjects, we specified that the observations are independent across 22 We dropped data of 3 subjects, since they totally randomized their choices. We used data from all other subjects, including inconsistent choices they made. Inconsistency means that a subject would accept a longer delay of a larger amount y, rather than taking x earlier, but would not wait for a shorter delay for the same y and x (For example, if an agent chooses 10,000 dong today over 60,000 dong with three days of delay, but is willing to wait 2 months to receive 60,000 dong rather than receiving 10,000 dong today, their answers are inconsistent). 23 The estimated coefficients of explanatory variables for r (discount rates) are multiplied by 100.
observations, but not within subjects (i.e., standard errors were adjusted for withinsubject correlation).
The largest effects are on discount rates r. Age, absolute income and mean village income are positively related with patience (lower r). Individuals who trade are more patient (lower r) but those engaged in family businesses are more present-biased (lower β). W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore (1989) assert that risky but high-paying jobs may attract individuals with high discounting, which may explain the correlation between family business and present bias. Of course, since occupation choice is partly endogenous, it is difficult to know whether preferences influence occupation choice or vice versa. None of the income variables explain individual difference in present bias (β) while the estimated coefficient of β in Table 7 (0.644) indicates subjects are present biased. This implies people are present biased regardless of their wealth, and the degree of present bias is comparable to estimates from a variety of other studies.
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The amount of money made in the risk game earlier in the experimental session is correlated with patience: individuals who received higher payments in the risk game exhibit lower discount rates r. The choices made by the individuals who were assigned the role of money delivery were not significantly different from other subjects. We also conducted regressions using instrumental variables for income. Table 9 shows the estimation results. The regression results from the instrumental variable estimations are not substantially different from the ones without instruments.
IV. Conclusion
We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to investigate how wealth, political history, occupation, and other demographic variables are correlated with risk and time discounting measured in experiments.
Our results suggest either villager income or mean village income are strong factors determining risk and time preferences. People living in poor villages are not necessarily afraid of uncertainty, in the sense of income variation; instead, they are averse to loss. From time discounting experiment, we found the income and mean village income are correlated with lower discount rates. Thus, people living in wealthier villages are not only less loss averse, but also more patient. This pattern implies that increasing village wealth or providing safety net may mitigate loss aversion and impatience. Our results also demonstrate that people are present biased regardless of their wealth. It suggests that policies could usefully focus not on increasing patience or subsidizing savings, per se, but on providing present-biased villagers with external commitment (as in Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) ). In addition, we found villagers in the north who had worked on collective farms and received food from the government on a regular basis are less averse to loss. This implies appropriate welfare policies can potentially reduce aversion to loss.
These results are exploratory and the experimental measures are not perfect.
Furthermore, in a cross-sectional study like this, it is difficult to conclude very much about the direction of causality between preferences and economic circumstances because the study was not designed to do so. We used instrumental variables to deal with the income endogeneity problem, using funeral costs and pest loss shocks to instrument for relative income and mean village income, respectively. Of course, preferences and circumstances may be formed interdependently. However, the fact that income variables and IV income measures yield similar results tend to suggest that mean village income influences preferences rather than preferences influencing mean village income.
Finally, one contribution of our study is to show some advantages of expanding measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those simple approximations with prospect theory and the Benhabib et al. three-parameter discounting model. In a poor, highly literate country, our subjects made comprehensible choices in a large battery of tasks while highly motivated to earn money. While these experiments take time, subjects in these sites are eager to participate and their opportunity cost of participating is low. As a result, these subjects will sit patiently and answer questions studiously while many dimensions of their economic life are measured. The experimental facts that are produced, and the interesting correlations that result, suggest that these instruments could be used in many other sites as well. The subject is a trusted agent of delayed delivery of money Risk Payment
The amount of money the subject earned earlier from risk experiment 
